The role of China in the latest round of skirmishes between India and Pakistan has once again revived the debate in the strategic circles about whether Beijing will be an active participant in future Indo-Pak conflicts.
The question being raised is whether India should be prepared for a “two-front challenge” from China and Pakistan simultaneously.
But then, the fact is that India has always faced this challenge in all the wars imposed on it by Pakistan. In that sense, it is not exactly a new challenge.
After all, the concept of a two-front challenge has broadly two dimensions or levels. It could be what experts call “collaborative” or “collusive”.
In the “collaborative” front, one country openly aids the other militarily in a coordinated manner; they fight jointly either at one front or at different fronts separately, forcing the enemy to divide its resources and attention.
In the case of the “collusive front”, one country aids the other morally, politically, and militarily through material and logistical support, either openly or covertly.
Of course, the two are not exclusive, as transitioning from the collusive threat to the collaborative threat could occur seamlessly. But so far, China seems to have followed the collusive approach, if the history of various Indo-Pak conflicts is any indication.
When one is talking of China, it is the People’s Republic of China, led by the communists, that was established on October 1, 1949. So, one may overlook Beijing’s role in the first Indo-Pak war in 1947-48. That was the time when China was embroiled in the civil war between the “nationalists” and the communists.
The second Indo-Pak war began on August 5, 1965. It ended in a United Nations-brokered ceasefire on September 23, 1965, with the active involvement of both the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR).
Of course, Pakistan continued violating this ceasefire even later, and it accused India of doing the same, but things did not go beyond control. In January 1966, the two countries signed the “Tashkent” declaration, brokered by the USSR, to resolve the war and improve bilateral relations.
A few facts are notable regarding the Chinese role in this war. India and China fought a war in 1962, three years before the India-Pakistan war of 1965. Following that, China’s relations with Pakistan turned northward. On March 2, 1963, the two signed an agreement in Beijing, with Islamabad graciously ceding a portion of Indian territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) to China.
This area, known as the Shaksgam Valley or Trans-Karakoram Tract, was roughly 5,180 square kilometers. India does not recognize this agreement and claims sovereignty over the ceded territory. Since then, China has linked up the old Silk Route Highway, which runs from Sinkiang to Gilgit in close proximity to the northern region of Ladakh.
In fact, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), passes through this region, which India considers as its territory but under illegal Sino-Pak control.
Therefore, during the 1965 India-Pakistan War, China adopted a strong support for Pakistan. It even issued verbal threats to enter the war if Indian troops did not cease their activities on the front of Sikkim (then India’s protectorate country; it joined India to become a full-fledged state on May 16, 1975).
This was said to have constrained India to retain five of its seven mountain divisions on its northern borders. Even the other two divisions were kept only in reserve and were not put on the frontline against Pakistan until the ceasefire was signed.
However, all said and done, China did not participate in the war, limiting itself to providing only moral and political backing to Pakistan.
The third Indo-Pakistan war began on December 3, 1971, and ended on December 16, 1971, with the surrender of Pakistani forces to India in Dhaka. But then, in the movement for Bangladesh since the beginning of the year, and the consequent brutal suppression by the Pakistani troops in what was then its eastern wing, had resulted in thousands of Bengali refugees migrating into India.
The Indian Army crossed the international border into East Pakistan only after being attacked by Pakistan in the Western sector. Still, before that, it was an open secret that India had provided training, resources, and weapons to the Bangladeshi freedom fighters.
By then, China’s relations with Pakistan had been cemented further, with Islamabad playing a role in organising the historic trip by late Henry Kissinger, then U.S. Secretary of State, to Beijing, leading to the Sino-American entente.
Simultaneously, Beijing’s relations with Moscow worsened like never before. Besides, India and the USSR concluded “the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation” on August 9, 1971, much to Beijing’s anguish.
It is against this background that in April 1971, Chinese Premier Chou En Lai sent a letter to Pakistani rulers. Among others, it said that East and West Pakistan was one of the “basic guarantees” for the construction of Pakistani prosperity, that the separatist movement in East Pakistan was a “handful movement” that desired to sabotage Pakistani unification, that “broad masses of the people” had no leaning whatsoever in the direction of separatism, and that India, along with Russia, were guilty of “gross interference” and exploitation of Pakistan’s internal affairs.
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