The recent capture of Mehmet Gören, a senior ISIS-K operative, has intensified longstanding accusations that Pakistan provides sanctuary to terrorist networks, directly challenging its credibility as a U.S. ally. Apprehended in a covert Turkish intelligence operation near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in December 2025, Gören—also known as Yahya—is accused of masterminding suicide attacks and facilitating operations for the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K).
Following the arrest, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid released an audio message condemning Pakistan for harboring ISIS terrorists, alleging the Taliban had monitored and even shared intelligence on their activities. Mujahid described ISIS as a “sinister phenomenon” and warned against using safe havens to threaten other nations, implicitly pointing to India as a potential target.
While Taliban claims require scrutiny, regional analysts have consistently highlighted evidence of a troubling nexus between Pakistan and ISIS-K. Reports indicate that operatives find refuge in Pakistani provinces like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where training camps and recruitment networks allegedly operate with varying levels of state tolerance or support.
Accumulating evidence over the years strengthens these allegations. In April 2024, Afghan authorities arrested Tajik recruits instructed to train in Quetta, Pakistan. Taliban Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi later hinted at three neighboring countries aiding ISIS-K—widely interpreted as implicating Pakistan in planning, training, and funding. Further, the chairman of the Baloch National Movement claimed at a UN meeting that ISIS camps in Balochistan operate under Pakistani army supervision.
Statements from captured operatives add weight to these claims. A founding ISIS-K member, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, alleged in a video that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) facilitated financial support for the group’s late emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan. The 2020 arrest of another Pakistani national, ISIS-K chief Aslam Farooqi, also revealed ISI links, prompting a senior Afghan official to label ISIS-K “a demon child of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.”
Recent developments suggest these networks are being leveraged for regional disruption. A June 2024 issue of ISIS-K’s magazine criticized the Taliban for engaging with India while issuing threats against New Delhi. An Indian think tank cited intelligence reports alleging the ISI is relocating ISIS-K cadres to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir to destabilize Jammu and Kashmir.
Local protests and social media accounts further allege state complicity, with claims that ISIS training centers in Mastung, Balochistan, operate under military protection. These allegations emerge amid heightened regional tensions, including Pakistani airstrikes on Taliban positions in Kabul in October 2025.
For Pakistan, these developments signal a collapse of its traditional “strategic depth” doctrine in Afghanistan. The Taliban, once seen as a compliant client, now asserts nationalist autonomy, reducing Islamabad’s influence. Critics fear that, having “lost” Afghanistan, Pakistan may increasingly rely on proxies like ISIS-K to destabilize the region, particularly targeting India.
The arrest of Gören and corroborating intelligence underscore that the Pakistan-ISIS nexus poses a severe threat to regional stability. With ISIS-K demonstrating both growing capability and intent to target U.S. interests, safe havens in Pakistan grant the group operational depth and recruitment access. Despite this, Pakistan retains its Major Non-NATO Ally status with Washington, benefiting from significant military cooperation. As evidence mounts, it becomes increasingly clear that Pakistan’s role as a reliable partner warrants serious reevaluation amid the broader threat landscape.
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