The Communist Party of China (CPC) has dedicated significant strategic resources to reshaping global perceptions of democracy. Through initiatives ranging from governance training programs in Africa to promoting the “China model” as a superior alternative, Beijing employs diverse tools to advance this vision. Central to this effort is a comprehensive narrative project aimed at challenging and ultimately diluting the long-standing belief that liberal democracy is the sole path to prosperity and stability.

This broader campaign includes sustained critiques of foreign electoral processes. Analysis of Chinese media and academic commentary during the 2024 global election cycle—involving over sixty countries—reveals how deeply this narrative is embedded within China’s propaganda ecosystem. Chinese outlets consistently highlighted the instability and unpredictability of electoral systems, particularly in nations facing economic or developmental pressures. The United States and India emerged as focal points, serving both as geopolitical rivals and as symbols of a political ideal the CPC seeks to deconstruct.

By repeatedly portraying foreign elections as scenes of dysfunction, polarization, and disorder, the CPC advances a counter-claim: that China’s Party-State model offers a more coherent, efficient, and socially stable form of governance. These electoral events have become discursive battlegrounds where Beijing contests the universality of liberal democracy and positions its own system as a preferable alternative.

The Party’s redefinition of democracy was formally outlined in its 2021 white paper, China: Democracy That Works. This document marked a pivotal shift, detaching the concept of democracy from electoral procedures and re-anchoring it in governance outcomes. It argues that legitimacy stems not from competitive elections but from the state’s ability to deliver tangible results for its people.

By shifting the criteria for “democracy” from political contestation to performance, the CPC challenges the normative primacy of liberal systems—especially that of the U.S.—while reframing its own model as substantively democratic. This reframing lies at the core of China’s global narrative project, echoing President Xi Jinping’s call to “tell China’s story well.” Through policy papers, state media, and think-tank diplomacy, the Party promotes a new political vocabulary that interprets democratic values through a results-driven, culturally specific lens.

Within this framework, the 2024 U.S. election was depicted as further evidence of liberal democracy’s internal decay. Commentaries described a process mired in factionalism, performative partisanship, and identity politics, portraying it as a “low-quality democracy” incapable of reconciling national interests with social stability. Similar critiques were directed at India’s national elections, with coverage emphasizing social divisions, religious tensions, and political polarization.

The consistent ideological message across these critiques is that liberal democracies may appear vibrant but are hollow in substance. In contrast, China’s “whole-process people’s democracy” is presented as a model that harmonizes efficiency with legitimacy, ensuring long-term policy continuity and social cohesion—qualities the Party argues electoral systems often fail to deliver.

This redefinition of political ideals extends beyond perception management; it carries strategic weight for Beijing. The more countries adopt a performance-based rather than procedural view of legitimacy, the more China can shape international norms in alignment with its political interests.

This narrative holds appeal in parts of the Global South, particularly among political elites frustrated by electoral volatility or disillusioned with governance outcomes. China’s promise of stability, order, and decisiveness offers an attractive alternative for leaders navigating institutional fragility or public fatigue. The CPC’s goal is not to reject democracy outright but to relativize it—transforming a supposedly universal ideal into a flexible concept that different systems can claim on their own terms.

However, the narrative’s strength is also its limitation. A focus on the dysfunctions of others risks highlighting the silences within China’s own system: the absence of open self-correction mechanisms, the lack of independent scrutiny, and the dangers of equating stability with legitimacy. The Party’s claim to efficiency remains credible only as long as it sustains economic growth and social cohesion—conditions now facing significant tests.

Nevertheless, China’s increasingly polished narrative project presents a challenge democracies cannot afford to ignore. This is not merely a contest of regimes but a contest of stories—over who defines democracy and why it matters.

For democracies, an effective response requires more than rebuttals or defensive rhetoric. It demands narratives that acknowledge shortcomings while framing them within a broader story of reform, resilience, and representation. The real struggle of our time extends beyond power and prosperity to the very meaning of politics. If China aims to persuade parts of the world that democracy has failed, democratic systems must be prepared to demonstrate—in practice and narrative—why, despite their flaws, they remain among the most enduring expressions of collective freedom.