February marked one of Pakistan’s bloodiest months in recent memory, not due to foreign aggression, but from a widespread failure of the country’s own security apparatus to protect its citizens. This period saw a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad, killing 36 worshippers, followed by a terror attack in Bajaur claiming 11 soldiers, and further bombings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These incidents highlight a persistent pattern of security lapses under Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s command.

Instead of transparently addressing these failures, the military is accused of resorting to a familiar institutional tactic: manufacturing an external crisis to deflect from internal accountability. Following the Islamabad mosque attack, thousands mourned as citizens openly condemned the security gaps, with reports suggesting authorities had prior intelligence of an imminent threat but failed to act. Critics contend that the ongoing security crisis is a direct result of the military’s long-standing support for jihadist groups, and while General Munir has attempted to rebrand certain militant outfits rhetorically, he has also allegedly espoused inflammatory, racially charged rhetoric.

On February 21, the Pakistan Air Force conducted strikes across Afghanistan’s Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost provinces, purportedly targeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) camps. However, this operation is viewed by many as a performance of strength for a domestic audience rather than a precise counterterrorism effort. Afghan authorities reported at least 18 fatalities in Paktika, including women and children, a claim corroborated by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which confirmed 13 civilian deaths and seven injuries. Critics argue this was a predictable outcome of striking a nation with limited air defense, knowing the optics of ‘retaliation’ would resonate domestically.

This escalation reflects a documented shift towards more aggressive military operations inside Afghanistan. Analysts suggest these strikes were launched precisely because the military could not answer for its domestic failures. As questions intensified regarding intelligence lapses and the army’s preoccupation with civilian politics over combating terrorism, the airstrikes provided a narrative redirect, positioning Pakistan as an aggrieved party fighting Afghan-based terrorism, rather than a failing security state unable to protect its own capital.

The situation rapidly intensified, with Pakistan declaring itself in “open war” with Afghanistan by February 27. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated Islamabad’s patience had been exhausted, leading to further Pakistani strikes on Kabul and other Afghan provinces. Afghan Deputy Spokesman Hamdullah Fitrat accused Pakistan of deliberately targeting civilian residences, with most casualties being women and children. Diplomats Without Borders warned that continued confrontation risks broader regional destabilization, noting a concerning lack of international diplomatic attention.

This violence against Afghans is not an isolated event; it is seen as an extension of an institutional culture accustomed to applying force domestically. According to the Baloch Yakjehti Committee, 1,223 Baloch individuals were forcibly disappeared in 2025, including 18 women, with over 200 extrajudicial killings reported. In February 2026, more enforced disappearances and in-custody deaths were documented in Balochistan, often with signs of severe torture. UN Special Rapporteurs have characterized these practices as serious human rights violations. The military’s conduct toward Afghan civilians, therefore, appears to reflect the same institutional disregard for civilian life, applied across a border.

This disregard has also long influenced Pakistan’s treatment of Afghan refugees. Pakistani police have reportedly conducted forced evictions, confiscated property, and denied refugees due process. Approximately USD 4 billion in Afghan-owned assets have allegedly been seized, and between September 2023 and February 2026, over one million Afghan nationals were forcibly deported. International organizations have condemned this as a violation of non-refoulement, urging Islamabad to reverse course. Afghans who built lives in Pakistan have seen their livelihoods stripped away by the same security establishment now presenting itself as an aggrieved neighbor.

This contradictory posture aligns with a broader pattern under General Munir, whose administration has aggressively projected strength internationally while persecuting domestic political rivals, notably former Prime Minister Imran Khan. His “hard state” policy against local armed groups and minority communities has generated deep resentment. The army continues to disappear students, silence lawyers, and conduct operations in its own villages, even as General Munir courts foreign dignitaries.

Domestic opposition to Munir is growing, evidenced by chants of “Murdabad” (death to) directed at him and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Gilgit-Baltistan following civilian killings during protests. On social media, hashtags like “Resign Asim Munir” and “Pakistan under military fascism” trend, documenting crackdowns and restrictions on freedom of expression. In Afghanistan, public anger over the airstrikes has led to widespread demonstrations condemning what is described as state terrorism. Critics argue the military’s poor record over the past two years, coupled with the active conflict with Afghanistan, deepens a deliberate strategy of manufactured instability designed to divert attention from fundamental governance failures.