NEW DELHI — Myanmar’s newly installed President Min Aung Hlaing is undertaking a 5-day state visit to India at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The trip, marking Hlaing’s first foreign tour since securing the presidency in widely discredited elections, underscores a broader geopolitical pivot for New Delhi. As analyzed by scholars Dr. Soumyodeep Deb and Aung Kyaw, India is increasingly prioritizing pragmatic regional security over democratic idealism in its relations with its eastern neighbor.

The diplomatic reception of a leader who orchestrated a bloody coup against a democratically elected government and oversaw widespread atrocities has drawn sharp international criticism. The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) urged India to condemn the administration as illegal and undemocratic. Mercy Chriesty Barends, an Indonesian Parliament member and APHR chairperson, emphatically stated, “Min Aung Hlaing is not Myanmar’s legitimate president,” raising questions about why the world’s largest democracy is engaging with the regime.

However, India’s current strategy is heavily influenced by historical missteps. Following Myanmar’s 1988 military coup, New Delhi severed ties on idealistic grounds, creating a diplomatic vacuum that China quickly filled. In 1989, Myanmar’s junta purchased $1 billion in military hardware from Beijing—one of the largest weapons deals in Myanmar’s history. China subsequently leveraged this influence, utilizing Myanmar’s territory to train northeastern Indian insurgent factions like the NSCN and ULFA, thereby posing a severe security threat to India.

Determined to avoid repeating history after the 2021 coup, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs declared that any developments in Myanmar directly impact India, necessitating a policy rooted in strategic national interests. Consequently, New Delhi has adopted a dual-track approach, balancing relations by engaging both the military junta and ethnic armed groups. India supplies continuous military hardware and spare parts to the junta, while simultaneously sending officials across the border and inviting various rebel factions to New Delhi for dialogue.

A focal point of this engagement is the Arakan Army (AA), a powerful rebel group that controls significant portions of the strategic Rakhine state. Following its territorial gains, the AA—which seeks greater strategic autonomy in Rakhine—initiated dialogue with the military junta. By deploying government officials to meet with the AA, India aims to build influence and safeguard its economic ambitions along the 1,693-kilometer shared border, which serves as India’s vital gateway to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

These economic ambitions hinge on massive infrastructure investments. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Corridor and the Sittwe Port, located in Myanmar’s Rakhine and Chin states, are designed to grant India’s landlocked northeastern states maritime access. The Sittwe project also serves as a strategic counterweight to China’s Kyaukphyu Port in Rakhine. Additionally, the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway seeks to physically connect India to two ASEAN nations, with potential future extensions to Vietnam. Though currently stalled by the ongoing civil war, New Delhi is actively collaborating with both the junta and ethnic armed groups to protect and expedite these projects.

During Hlaing’s visit, which resulted in the signing of several memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and agreements, Myanmar reiterated its commitment to preventing its territory from being used for anti-India activities. Addressing the media in a press briefing, the Indian foreign secretary clarified that India’s engagement is not dictated by Myanmar’s internal political arrangements. In a veiled reference to China, he noted that disengaging over internal politics would only allow other nations without democratic interests to seize the advantage.

On the battlefield, the Myanmar Army is currently consolidating power and capturing ground. Backed by a new conscript law to funnel additional troops to the frontlines, and supported by superior firepower from Russia, China, and India, the junta maintains a distinct military advantage over rebel forces.

As the India-China rivalry intensifies, Deb and Kyaw conclude that New Delhi’s recalibrated Myanmar policy is an unavoidable strategic necessity. However, they caution that as a global democracy, India must carefully navigate this pragmatic path and continue to raise crucial issues of human rights and democratic governance with the regime.